Tigerpapers

Pondering the palimpsest and panoply of the planet.

Archive for the tag “John Dewey”

The Political Importance of the Liberal Arts

We have heard much about the relative decline of the American education system over the past decade (or two, or three). While there is much truth to these various assertions and statistics that document the decline, there have been a wide-range of different diagnoses of the root source of this general decline, as well as different proposed solutions. A common political response is broad rhetoric calling for an increase in development of the so-called STEM fields– Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics. The last two American presidents have both specifically cited this solution in their State of the Union addresses, and have both increased funding for organizations and initiatives in these fields. Additionally, work visas for immigrants to the US are more readily available to applicants with a skilled background in the STEM fields. The thinking is that this type of expertise is necessary for innovation, and that this innovation will drive the economy and secure the future for the ‘winners’ of the most well-educated nation competition. All of this information is rather uncontroversial, and I certainly have no problem with more focus and funding for education on any kind, whether it is STEM-oriented or otherwise. An objection I have, however, is that the emphasis on STEM field competition seems to be in danger of becoming a sort of Zero-Sum game, in which a top-down political and corporate mandate for more STEM education means a corresponding decrease of perceived importance or respect for other fields or types of education that may not seem to lead to instant innovation or economic dynamism. I am speaking especially about the cultural fields of education known as the Liberal Arts, or the Humanities.

The Liberal Arts encompass areas such as History, the Arts (Performing and Visual), Literature, Languages, and Philosophy, among many more. If we wanted to compare them with the STEM fields on more equal footing, we would need to call them by an easily-understood acronym– HALP (or perhaps HALLP?). Since this obviously not very appealing, we will stick with either of the classical phrases of Liberal Arts or Humanities. The original Latin meaning of artes liberales signifies what was thought necessary for a free citizen to study. This is exactly the case I would like to make here in regards to the political importance of the Liberal Arts.

I would characterize professional, technical, or vocational curricula as various types of training, with a goal of developing specific skill-sets for a particular employment. The areas of the Liberal Arts, however, lead to a more universal and well-rounded education. In this sense, Education, derived from its original Latin meaning of “leading out of”, is conducted not for any specific end in itself, other than a more general and complete individual intellectual development and understanding of the world. I would argue that a person with this type of education could be taught virtually any skill with a certain amount of training, but that education itself is a more profound and long-term (ideally lifelong) personal development.

Once again, I have no problem at all with the emphasis on the advanced training in the STEM fields, but I am afraid that, in the current social and political environment, this emphasis can lead to a drastic undervaluing of the conception of a more universal education as represented especially through study of the Liberal Arts. The USA is fortunate to have a strong system of universities which still maintain a rich Liberal Arts tradition. I do not think this system can remain strong indefinitely given the social and financial pressures. When I was entering college over a decade ago, I knew that I wanted to do my ‘major’ in History, not because I was planning for any specific future employment but because I liked it and was interested in it (a quick glance at the topics on this website will reveal that I still hold this and other humanistic interests). In a scene that has no doubt occurred to many students countless times over the past decades, I was always asked by acquaintances and interlocutors “what I wanted to do with that degree after I graduated…become a teacher?” It is maintained by many folks that someone who studies history is either unemployable, or can only work as a teacher (in history, of course). The pressure is great to spend the valuable formative years on training that leads to employment, rather than education that is interesting and intellectually and personally fulfilling.

I recently returned to school and earned a Master’s degree, which was quite rewarding for me even if it did not directly lead to new or higher-paying employment, or necessary on-the-job skills. In the United Kingdom, where I studied, I became aware of the fact that upcoming budget cuts from the government would slash and burn a number of departments throughout the university system. My own department of Classical Studies would soon be phased out permanently, as well as several modern language programs and countless others. This is a failure of leadership.  In America, while I am happy that STEM fields are apparently receiving better funding and support, I have to take strong issue with the harsh budget cuts at the federal, state, and local levels. For shamefully short-sighted reasons, a number of politicians feel that the best way to make up for their (mostly self-inflicted) budgetary shortfalls is to cut funding for education. It is inconceivable how people could be elected or certainly re-elected who support such measures. Many politicians consider the enormously outsized and wasteful military budget to be sacrosanct, while having no qualms in cutting off any education programs whatever (not to mention the select few who want to eliminate the Department of Education altogether). I would submit that re-allocating even 10% of the monstrous “defense” budget towards education would be a more efficient, forward-looking, ethical, and a valuable use of public funds (and who could disagree that a more well-educated population itself would do more for the ‘defense’ of a country than the newest redundant fighter plane or missile). I will rest my case (and my rant) with the support of the two charts below.

Back to the topic at hand, I maintain that education, especially universal liberal education, is necessary for the maintenance of a healthy democratic society. This is exactly the position of American philosopher and educator John Dewey (1859-1952), who was one of the most important and influential theorists and reformers of modern school systems (not only in America, but in Turkey and China). In several books, especially his 1916 Democracy and Education, Dewey describes how education should be a synthesis between the needs of the individual and the society, whose ultimate aim is to teach a person how to live. As a tireless defender of democracy, Dewey knew that a well-educated population was necessary for the survival of an ordered society. For example, without learning how to think independently and use critical judgment, how can a person be expected to choose leaders or public policies? This type of independent and critical thinking, as well as broad cultural and historical perspective, is developed especially through engagement with the Liberal Arts. Dewey’s progressive style of education fell somewhat out of favor during the Cold War, when technological and scientific education was promoted as essential for national survival (e.g.: the “Sputnik” moment and the Space Race). With the political, financial, and rhetorical emphasis now finding favor with the STEM fields, it is, in my opinion, imperative to not lose sight of the importance of liberal, progressive, humanistic studies as well. While better STEM training can lead to technological, industrial, and economical growth and innovation, a more universal Liberal Arts education can lead to a stronger Democracy– that is, a body politic that is curious, cultured, creative, and critical.

(For some further reading, I can endorse these related opinions about justifying culture by Alain de Botton, why knowledge is not about securing a gain on student debt by Emmanuel Jaffelin, and how higher education became corporatized.)

Kemal Atatürk: Dictator, Liberal Reformer, or Both?

On this date 131 years ago, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder and first president of the modern Republic of Turkey, was born. He is a man of immense, almost mythical, historical importance in Turkey today, where it is still a criminal offense to express any opinion which diminishes his character. Of course, it is not my intention here to commit such an offense, for I come to praise Atatürk, not to defame him. I will first provide a brief account of his life and accomplishments, followed by my main purpose of examining the political legacy of Atatürk and why I believe he is an especially interesting and rare example of a useful, or benevolent, dictator.

His Life and Military Achievements

Atatürk was born to a middle-class family in 1881 in Salonica (present-day Thessolaniki, Greece) in the Ottoman Empire. His given name was Mustafa, and his second name Kemal was either given to him by a teacher because of his excellence, or to distinguish him from another Mustafa, or chosen by Atatürk himself after a famous poet. Throughout his life, he gained the further honorific titles of BeyPashaGhazi, and, three years before his death, Atatürk (which means “Father of the Turks”). We can attribute both the young Mustafa’s future military career as well as his modernizing reforms to the fact that his father had dedicated the boy to the military and also sent him to a modern secular school rather than an Islamic madrassa. Accordingly, Atatürk attended military academies from 1893-1905, and emerged as one of the Empire’s best young officers at the rank of Major. Secretly, he was also involved in revolutionary groups that intended to reform the Empire.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938)

Atatürk successfully defended an Ottoman fortress in Libya during the 1911-12 Italo-Turkish war, which was one of the few victories for the Turks against the superior Italian forces. In 1912-13, he acquitted himself admirably once more in a losing effort in the Balkan wars, where he was assigned to the Gallipoli peninsula, which would prepare him for his next, more famous task. During World War I (which Atatürk personally opposed in favor of neutrality), he was the leading Turkish commander in the Battle of Gallipoli. This disastrous and incompetent gamble by Winston Churchill caused a total of up to 250,000 deaths on both sides– Ottoman and British/Australian/New Zealand, respectively. Atatürk successfully repulsed waves of Allied soldiers and inflicted a huge defeat on the Allied forces, and won a defining victory for the Turkish people. He spent the rest of the war picking up tactical victories in other parts of the Empire against Russian and British forces, in what was ultimately a doomed Ottoman and Central Powers war effort (which he had predicted after a mid-war trip to see the front lines in Germany).

The conclusion of the War saw the occupation of the Empire by British, French, Italian, and Greek forces. The partitioning of the Ottoman Empire was meekly agreed to by the sultan and was considered a fait accompli. Atatürk, however, did not support this outcome. From 1919-22 he organized a revolutionary army and ran his capital out of Ankara in opposition to the occupied Constantinople. In a series of brilliant maneuvers and diplomacy, he gradually pushed out all the European occupiers, won support for the cause of Turkish nationhood throughout the country, preserved Turkish sovereignty in all of the Anatolia landmass, and demanded to be respected on equal terms at the Lausanne conference at the end of 1922. By this time, all the other powers were too weak or distracted to continue campaigning for pieces of the old Empire, and Atatürk was able to proclaim, in 1923, the new Republic of Turkey. After leading the new government as President and then Prime Minister, he died at the age of 57 of cirrhosis, due to his heavy consumption of raki and his strenuous lifestyle.

His Political and Cultural Reforms

At the founding of the new Republic, Turkey was still a medieval country in many respects. It had been ruled by an absolute monarch for centuries, and the literacy rate was around 10%. Atatürk, the new President, seized the moment to radically modernize virtually every aspect of the moribund society. His unquestioned prestige and power as a successful and nationalistic military leader allowed him to proceed with little resistance. Let’s take a quick look at some of his most important actions:

  • Atatürk avoided the Fascist and Communist movements that were ascendant in countries to the north in favor of his own modernizing and pragmatic ideology which came to be known as Kemalism.
  • Introduced the concept of Secularism, establishing complete separation of religion and political powers.
  • Replaced the Sharia court system with a secular civil code modeled after the Swiss Civil Code, and a penal code modeled after the Italian Penal Code.
  • Abolished the Ottoman Caliphate and replaced it with the Turkish Grand National Assembly. This body was democratic in nature, which was a first for Muslim middle-eastern countries. This parliamentary system now had elections, an assembly, a Prime Minister, and a President.
  • Began to industrialize the country, despite a complete lack of skill, educated classes, or infrastructure. Established state-owned factories throughout the country in textiles, agriculture, machinery, railroads, and automobiles, many of which became successful and privatized in the second half of the 20th century.
  • Focused heavily on educational reforms. Only nine months into the new state, he invited eminent American philosopher and educational reformer John Dewey to visit Turkey and provide advice. A system of compulsory education with a common curriculum was begun, even if only the first four years were mandatory at first.
  • Changed the difficult-to-learn Arabic script with a Latin-based alphabet. Travelled the country throughout his life to personally give lessons in the new alphabet, and often attended school and university classes in public.
  • Encouraged the wear and use of modern European clothes and hats, outlawing the fez and the turban.
  • Supported complete equal rights and opportunities for women, which was achieved in 1934 (before several European countries).
  • Supported an expansion of the arts and humanities into areas previously neglected or outlawed by the Islamic regime. Examples include new museums, historical studies, works of art, music, literature, architecture, libraries, cultural centers called “People’s Houses”, new book and magazine publications, and an overall humanistic outlook.
  • Adopted the foreign policy motto of “peace at home and peace in the world.” After the revolutionary war of independence, Atatürk never used military force again as a matter of foreign policy. Impressively, he established mutually peaceful friendships with his Greek neighbors, the Soviet Union, the Shah of Iran, the King of Afghanistan, King Edward VIII, the Balkans, and 15 European nations. He opened and commercialized the Dardanelles strait, and maintained a policy of general neutrality, which outlived him through WWII and to the present day.

His Legacy as Political Model

Now that we have some of the historical facts in mind, let us consider the central question– namely, Atatürk’s “dictator-ness.” If we define “dictator” as “a ruler with total power over a country, typically one who has obtained power by force,” then Atatürk surely fits the definition. The armies he raised in the War of Independence were basically revolutionary armies not just against foreign occupiers, but against the “legitimate” government of the Sultan, whom he overthrew. He maintained total control of the new nation by force from 1922 until his death in 1938. He established the mechanisms of democracy, including elections, but there was only one political party to choose from– his own. Occasionally he allowed opposition parties to appear, but if they opposed him in any substantial way they were immediately crushed. He modernized the country and brought it to the 20th century, but against the will of many people. He denounced the Armenian genocide in 1915, but later allowed the participation of many of its instigators in the War of Independence in order to have a more unified Turkey. What are we to make of these ambiguities?

The list of his reforms and their positive impact is undeniable. His model of Kemalism was an important step towards the project of strengthening the new Republic and keeping it independent (from outside and inside). I think it is important to judge the man by the standards of his time, and his obstacles. He single-handedly set in motion the liberal reforms and progress on many fronts in what had been a backwards, moribund (dare I say, Byzantine) Ottoman Empire. He was a dictator in a time of many dictators, but one who actually improved his country and his people’s lives, and without the need for starting new wars. From this point of view, it was necessary for Atatürk to take the actions he did to impose his will unilaterally. However this may be, he must remain merely the exception rather than the rule, as far as dictators are concerned. For every Atatürk, there are dozens of Mussolinis or Francos who use their absolute power for rather more illiberal ends.

Every modern developed country has got to this point by suffering through either a civil war or a dictator. In the case of Turkey, there has been neither since the death of Atatürk. Turkey has grown into a prosperous country with an economic growth rate equal to that of China. It is the most well-educated and liberal of the Middle Eastern Muslim countries, and this is because of the reforms of Atatürk and their lingering effect. Nevertheless, the idea of Kemalism has probably outlived its usefulness. For decades, the military maintained the independence and secular nature of the government by force, often by means of coups d’etat. The time for this practice must come to an end. The current Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has realized this and taken many steps to weaken the absolute power of the military by placing it under more civilian control. This may be frightening to some, but it is a necessary next step for Turkey to become a modern democracy.

In addition, the legacy of Atatürk should be one of respect for his many achievements and his central place in history, not one with the rigidity and dogmatism of a national deity who cannot be criticized. The freedom of speech must be absolute. Finally, Turkey should continue to seek integration into the European Union by following the steps required towards becoming a modern democracy. Atatürk himself, a great pragmatist, would surely have recognized this and encouraged his country to continue the expansion of liberal policies, human rights, and all freedoms of expression.

Will Durant and the Story of Philosophy

I concluded my last post on this website, Defining Philosophy and Its Uses, with a long quotation from Will Durant stating the importance of philosophy as a synthesis of knowledge and distiller of wisdom. Now, I would like to write more about Durant and why he is important. Unlike Bertrand Russell, whom I have discussed several times, Durant was not primarily a philosopher or an academic. He was primarily a popular writer of world history and philosophy. His first major work was The Story of Philosophy in 1926, which I will compare with Russell’s similarly-themed 1945 work, A History of Western Philosophy.

From: willdurant.com

Will Durant was born in Massachusetts in 1885, and after receiving a Jesuit education, began working as a journalist, school teacher, and librarian. As a young man he was politically aligned with the socialist cause, which led him to begin teaching at an advanced working-class school, and which influenced his social views the rest of his life. He gradually rejected the political radicalism which became associated with socialism of the period, and deepened his relationship with philosophy and culture. He quit his teaching job in 1913 in pursuit of a doctorate in philosophy, and a bigger classroom. The Story of Philosophy was published in 1926, and became an enormous popular success that gave Durant financial independence for the rest of his life. Accordingly, he used this freedom to continue his lifelong project of spreading knowledge and culture to the masses–that is, to the common, non-academic, working-class reader. Along with his wife Ariel, he spent the rest of his very long life working on the 10-volume, 10,000+ page The Story of Civilization. He died in 1981 at the age of 96. Many of his works can be downloaded and read for free from the internet (The Story of Philosophy here; the first 4 volumes of The Story of Civilization here; some assorted articles here).

I have already mentioned how one of the downsides of Russell’s History is its rather cursory, and occasionally overly-critical, commentary on large swathes of important thinkers, which was obviously a necessity for a book with such an enormous scope. In the case of Durant’s work, this criticism must be even more pronounced. Rather than attempting to paint a complete picture of all of western philosophy, Durant is satisfied to go into reasonable depth with just a small and select group of the most important thinkers (and, as we shall see, some that were his personal favorites). The main chapters of the work are based around vignettes of Plato, Aristotle, Francis Bacon, Spinoza, Voltaire, Kant, Schopenhauer, Herbert Spencer, Nietzsche, and short discussions of then-contemporary European and American philosophers–Henri Bergson, Benedetto Croce, and Bertrand Russell; and George Santayana, William James, and John Dewey. Even from within this small group, you will no doubt notice the presence of some names that are not considered part of the most important or influential philosophic tradition–Herbert Spencer most of all, and Voltaire to a lesser degree. In my opinion, the chapter on Voltaire needs no apology since it is such an elegant and entertaining description of an almost impossibly interesting and powerful mind (it is probably my favorite part of the book, and I learned much about the now criminally-underrated Enlightenment thinker). Spencer is more perplexing, and must be mostly attributed to the fact that he seemed to share Durant’s mission for synthesizing and uniting all science and knowledge into a useful whole for mankind, rather than its many technical parts. In any case, Durant states his purpose in the preface:

This book is not a complete history of philosophy. It is an attempt to humanize knowledge by centering the story of speculative thought around certain dominant personalities. Certain lesser figures have been omitted in order that those selected might have the space required to make them live. Hence the inadequate treatment of the half-legendary pre-Socratics, the Stoics and Epicureans, the Scholastics, and the epistemologists. The author believes that epistemology has kidnapped modern philosophy, and well nigh ruined it; he hopes for the time when the study of the knowledge-process will be recognized as the business of the science of psychology, and when philosophy will again be understood as the synthetic interpretation of all experience rather than the analytic description of the mode and process of experience itself. Analysis belongs to science, and gives us knowledge; philosophy must provide a synthesis for wisdom.

In this purpose, I think there is no doubt that he has succeeded. The Story of Philosophy is not only eminently readable, but engrossing, pleasurable, and fully worthy of the word ‘story’. It was difficult to select even some short representative passages to quote here, because every sentence is elegantly and poetically crafted, and the book is already such a compact and fast-moving summary of its protagonists. It is often said that the best way to understand philosophy is to read the works of the great philosophers directly. If we are to make exceptions to this dictum, I think the best place to begin for the young or uninitiated student of philosophy is The Story of Philosophy, followed by Russell’s more comprehensive, critical, and profound (though no less stylistically written) A History of Western Philosophy. Both works also achieve the identical goal of both authors in spreading and increasing human wisdom through knowledge and culture, and via history and philosophy.

(Incidentally, these two men were not necessarily in agreement on specific views within philosophy, but happened to share the same overall education purpose. In his autobiography, Russell includes a long letter from Durant, which appears to have been their only direct communication. Durant gives a rather long-winded account of his views on the antagonism of science and philosophy, and states his newest mission of interviewing all the greatest minds in the world for their opinions on the meaning of life, and ends with a list of his own literary and professional qualifications. Russell responds tersely, and somewhat dismissively, that “I am sorry to say that at the moment I am so busy as to be convinced that life has no meaning whatever… I do not see that we can judge what would be the result of the discovery of truth, since none has hitherto been discovered.”)

Durant criticizing Plato:

What Plato lacks above all, perhaps, is the Heracleitean sense of flux and change; he is too anxious to have the moving picture of this world become a fixed and still tableau. He loves order exclusively, like any timid philosopher; he has been frightened by the democratic turbulence of Athens into an extreme neglect of individual values; he arranges men in classes like an entomologist classifying flies; and he is not averse to using priestly humbug to secure his ends. His state is static; it might easily become an old-fogey society, ruled by inflexible octogenarians hostile to invention and jealous of change. It is mere science without art; it exalts order, so dear to the scientific mind, and quite neglects that liberty which is the soul of art; it worships the name of beauty, but exiles the artists who alone can make beauty or point it out. It is a Sparta or a Prussia, not an ideal state.

On adapting Plato to our own purposes (educational and political reform in this case):

And now that these unpleasant necessities are candidly written down, it remains to do willing homage to the power and profundity of Plato’s conception. Essentially he is right–is he not?–what this world needs is to be ruled by its wisest men. It is our business to adapt his thought to our own times and today we must take democracy for granted: we cannot limit the suffrage as Plato proposed; but we can put restrictions on the holding of office, and in this way secure that mixture of democracy and aristocracy which Plato seems to have in mind. We may accept without quarrel his contention that statesmen should be as specifically and thoroughly trained as physicians; we might establish departments of political science and administration in our universities; and when these departments have begun to function adequately we might make men ineligible for nomination to political office unless they were graduates of such political schools. We might even make every man eligible for an office who had been trained for it, and thereby eliminate entirely that complex system of nominations in which the corruption of our democracy has its seat; let the electorate choose any man who, properly trained and qualified, announces himself as a candidate. In this way democratic choice would be immeasurably wider than now, when Tweedledum and Tweedledee stage their quadrennial show and sham. Only one amendment would be required to make quite democratic this plan for the restriction of office to graduates in administrative technique; and that would be such equality of educational opportunity as would open to all men and women, irrespective of the means of their parents, the road to university training and political advancement. It would be very simple to have and counties and states offer scholarships to all graduates of grammar school, high school and who had shown. a certain standard’ of ability, and whose parents were financially unable to see them through the next stage of the educational process. That would be a democracy worthy of the name.

On the some of the problems with Aristotle:

It is difficult to be enthusiastic about Aristotle, because it was difficult for him to be enthusiastic about anything… He realized too completely the Delphic command to avoid excess: he is so anxious to pare away extremes that at last nothing is left. He is so fearful of disorder that he forgets to be fearful of slavery; he.is so timid of uncertain change that he prefers a certain changelessness that near resembles death. He lacks that Heraclitean sense of flux which justifies the conservative in believing that all permanent change is gradual, and justifies the radical in believing that no changelessness is permanent. He forgets that Plato’s communism was meant only for the elite, the unselfish and ungreedy few; and he comes deviously to a Platonic result when he says that though property should be private, its use should be as far as possible common. He does not see (and perhaps he could not be expected in his early day to see) that individual control of the means of production was stimulating and salutary only when these means were so simple as to be purchasable by any man; and that their increasing complexity and cost lead to a dangerous centralization of ownership and power, and to an artificial and finally disruptive inequality.

On Francis Bacon:

His achievement was not the less great because it was indirect. His philosophical works, though little read now, “moved the intellects which moved the world.” He made himself the eloquent voice of the optimism and resolution of the Renaissance. Never was any man so great a stimulus to other thinkers… The whole tenor and career of British thought have followed the philosophy of Bacon. His tendency to conceive the world in Democritean mechanical terms gave to his secretary, Hobbes, the starting-point for a thorough-going materialism; his inductive metbod gave to Locke the idea of an empirical psychology, bound by observation and freed from theology and metaphysics; and his emphasis on “commodities” and “fruits” found formulation in Bentham’s identification of the useful and the good. Wherever the spirit of control has overcome the spirit of resignation, Bacon’s influence has been felt. He is the voice of all those Europeans who have changed a continent from a forest into a treasure-land of art and science, and have made their little peninsula the center of the world… Everything is possible to man. Time is young; give us some little centuries, and we shall control and remake all things. We shall perhaps at last learn the noblest lesson of all, that man must not fight man, but must make war only on the obstacles that nature offers to the triumph of man.

Durant’s simple “Table of Philosophic Affiliations”. Of the philosophers mentioned in his book, only Rousseau is missing, whom I would place somewhere to the beneath and to the left of Liebniz.

On Intelligence and Morals in the Ethics of Spinoza (the earliest and favorite of Durant’s influences):

Ultimately there are but three systems of ethics, three conceptions of the ideal character and the moral life. One is that of Buddha and Jesus, which stresses the feminine virtues, considers all men to be equally precious, resists evil only by returning good, identifies virtue with love, and inclines in politics to unlimited democracy. Another is the ethic of Machiavelli and Nietzsche, which stresses the masculine virtues, accepts the inequality of men, relishes the risks of combat and conquest and rule, identifies virtue with power, and exalts an hereditary aristocracy. A third, the ethic of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, denies the universal applicability of either the feminine or the masculine virtues; considers that only the informed and mature mind can judge, according to diverse circumstance, when love should rule, and when power; identifies virtue, therefore, with intelligence; and advocates a varying mixture of aristocracy and democracy in government. It is the distinction of Spinoza that his ethic unconsciously reconciles these apparently hostile philosophies, weaves them into a harmonious unity, and gives us in consequence a system of morals which is the supreme achievement of modern thought. He begins by making happiness the goal of conduct; and he defines happiness very simply as the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain. But pleasure and pain are relative, not absolute; and they are not states but transitions… He thinks that egoism is a necessary corollary of the supreme instinct of self-preservation…

So he builds his ethic not on altruism and the natural goodness of man, like utopian reformers; nor on selfishness and the natural wickedness of man, like cynical conservatives, but on what he considers to be an inevitable and justifiable egoism… He believes it is a simple matter to show that hatred, perhaps because it trembles on the verge of love, can be more easily overcome by love than by reciprocated hate. For hatred is fed on the feeling that it is returned; whereas “he who believes himself to be loved by one whom he hates is a prey to the conflicting emotions of hatred and love,” since (as Spinoza perhaps too optimistically believes) love tends to beget love; so that his hatred disintegrates and loses force…

Spinoza’s ethics flows from his metaphysics: just as reason there lay in the perception of law in the chaotic flux of things, so here it lies in the establishment of law in the chaotic flux of desires; there it lay in seeing, here it lies in acting, sub specie eternitatis–under the form of eternity; in making perception and action fit the eternal perspective of the whole. Thought helps us to this larger view because it is aided by imagination, which presents to consciousness those distant effects of present actions which could have no play upon reaction if reaction were thoughtlessly immediate. The great obstacle to intelligent behavior is the superior vividness of present sensations as compared with those projected memories which we call imagination. By imagination and reason we turn experience into foresight; we become the creators of our future, and cease to be the slaves of our past. So we achieve the only freedom possible to man. The passivity of passion is “human bondage,” the action of reason is human liberty. Freedom is not from causal law or process, but from partial passion or impulse; and freedom not from passion, but from uncoordinated and uncompleted passion. We are free only where we know. To be a superman is to be free not from the restraints of social justice and amenity, but from the individualism of the instincts. With this completeness and integrity comes the equanimity of the wise man; not the aristocratic self-complacency of Aristotle’s hero, much less the supercilious superiority of Nietzsche’s ideal, but a more comradely poise and peace of mind. “Men who are good by reason–i. e., men who, under the guidance of reason, seek what is useful to them–desire nothing for themselves which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind.” To be great is not to be placed above humanity, ruling others; but to stand above the partialities and futilities of uninformed desire, and to rule one’s self…

Such a philosophy teaches us to say Yea to life, and even to death–“a free man thinks of nothing less than of death; and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life.” It calms our fretted egos with its large perspective; it reconciles us to the limitations within which our purposes must be circumscribed. It may lead to resignation and an Orientally supine passivity; but it is also the indispensable basis of all wisdom and all strength.

On Voltaire:

Italy had a Renaissance, and Germany had a Reformation, but France had Voltaire; he was for his country both Renaissance and Reformation, and half the Revolution. He carried on the antiseptic scepticism of Montaigne, and the healthy earthy humor of Rabelais; he fought superstition and corruption more savagely and effectively than Luther or Erasmus, Calvin or Knox or Melanchthon; he helped to make the powder with which Mirabeau and Marat, Danton and Robespierre blew up the Old Regime…

No, never has a writer had in his lifetime such influence. Despite exile, imprisonment, and the suppression of almost everyone of his books by the minions of church and state, he forged fiercely a path for his truth, until at last kings, popes and emperors catered to him, thrones trembled before him, and half the world listened to catch his every word. It was an age in which many things called for a destroyer. “Laughing lions must come,” said Nietzsche; well, Voltaire came, and “annihilated with laughter.” He and Rousseau were the two voices of a vast process of economic and political transition from feudal aristocracy to the rule of the middle class…

He was happy in his garden, planting fruit trees which he did not expect to see flourish in his lifetime. When an admirer praised the work he had done for posterity he answered, ”Yes, I have planted 4000 trees.”

He rejects all systems, and suspects that “every chief of a sect in philosophy has been a little of a quack.” “The further I go, the more I am confirmed in the idea that systems of metaphysics are for philosophers what novels are for women.” “It is only charlatans who are certain. We know nothing of first principles. It is truly extravagant to define God, angels, and minds, and to know precisely why God formed the world, when we do not know why we move our arms at will. Doubt is not a very agreeable state, but certainty is a ridiculous one.”

On Kant:

The great achievement of Kant is to have shown, once for all, that the external world is known to us only as sensation; and that the mind is no mere helpless tabula rasa, the inactive victim of sensation, but a positive agent, selecting and reconstructing experience as experience arrives. We can make subtractions from this accomplishment without injuring its essential greatness…

There is something of a severe Scotch Calvinism in this opposition of duty to happiness; Kant continues Luther and the Stoic Reformation:, as Voltaire continues Montaigne and·the Epicurean Renaissance. He represented a stern reaction against the egoism and hedonism in which Helvetius and Holbach had formulated the life of their reckless era, very much as Luther had reacted against the luxury and laxity of Mediterranean Italy. But after a century of reaction against the absolutism of Kant’s ethics, we find ourselves again in a welter of urban sensualism and immorality, of ruthless individualism untempered with democratic conscience or aristocratic honor; and perhaps the day will soon come when a disintegrating civilization will welcome again the Kantian call to duty…

After a century of struggle between the idealism of Kant, variously reformed, and the materialism of the Enlightenment, variously redressed, the victory seems to lie with Kant. Philosophy will never again be so naive as in her earlier and simpler days; she must always be different hereafter, and profounder, because Kant lived.

On Schopenhauer:

Part of the cause of pessimism, in Schopenhauer and his contemporaries, lay in their romantic attitudes and expectations. Youth expects too much of the· world; pessimism is the morning after optimism, just as 1815 had to pay for 1789. The romantic exaltation and liberation of feeling, instinct and will, and the romantic contempt for intellect, restraint, and order, brought their natural penalties; for “the world,” as Horace Walpole said, “is a comedy for those who think, but a tragedy for those who feel.”…

Is it true that ”he that increaseth lmowledge increaseth sorrow,” and that it is the most highly organized beings that suffer most? Yes; but it is also true that the growth of knowledge increases joy as well as sorrow, and that the subtlest delights, as well as the keenest pains, are reserved for the developed soul. Voltaire rightly preferred the Brahmin’s ”unhappy” to the blissful ignorance of the peasant woman; we wish to experience life keenly and deeply, even at the cost of pain; we wish to venture into its innermost secrets, even at the cost of disillusionment…

There are other difficulties, more technical and less vital, in this remarkable and stimulating philosophy. How can suicide ever occur in a world where the only real force is the will to live? How can the intellect, begotten and brought up as servant of the will, ever achieve independence and objectivity? Does genius lie in knowledge divorced from will, or does it contain, as its driving force” an immense power of will, even a large alloy of personal ambition and. conceit? Is madness connected with genius in general, or rather with only the “romantic” type of genius (Byron, Shelley, Poe, Heine, Swinburne, Strindberg, Dostoievski, etc.); and is not the “classic” and profounder type of genius exceptionally sound (Socrates, Plato, Spinoza, Bacon, Newton, Voltaire, Goethe, Darwin, Whitman, etc.)? What if the proper function of intellect and philosophy is not the denial of the will but the coordination of desires into a united and harmonious, will? What if “will” itself, except as the unified product of such coordination, is a mythical abstraction, as shadowy as “force”?…

On Nietzsche:

Only a professor of paradox could rank the obscure and dogmatic fragments of Heraclitus above the mellowed wisdom and the developed art of Plato. With all his philology, Nietzsche never quite penetrated to the spirit of the Greeks; never learned the lesson that moderation and self-knowledge (as taught by the Delphic inscriptions and the greater· philosophers) must bank, without extinguishing, the fires of passion and desire; that Apollo must limit Dionysus. Some have described Nietzsche as a pagan; but he was not that: neither Greek pagan like Pericles nor German pagan like Goethe; he lacked the balance and restraint that made these men strong. “I shall give back to men the serenity which is the condition of all culture,” he writes, but alas, how can one give what one has not? …

Nietzsche here fell short of that historical sense which he lauded as so necessary to philosophy; or he would have seen the doctrine of meekness and humbleness of heart as a necessary antidote to the violent and warlike virtues of the barbarians who nearly destroyed, in the first millennium of the Christian era, that very culture to which Nietzsche always returns for nourishment and refuge. Surely this wild emphasis on power and movement is the echo of a feverish and chaotic age? This supposedly universal “will to power” hardly expresses the quiescence of the Hindu, the calm of the Chinese, or the satisfied routine of the medieval peasant. Power is the idol of some of us; but most of us long rather for security and peace…

Foiled in his search for love, he turned upon woman with a bitterness unworthy of a philosopher, and unnatural in a man; missing parentage and losing friendship, he never knew that the finest moments of life come through mutuality and comradeship, rather than from domination and war. He did not live long enough, or widely enough, to mature his half-truths into wisdom. Perhaps if he had lived longer he would have turned his strident chaos into a harmonious philosophy. Truer of him than of the Jesus to whom he applied them, were his own words: “He died too early; he himself would have revoked his doctrine had he Teached” a riper age; “noble enough to revoke he was!” But death had other plans…

He spoke with bitterness, but with invaluable sincerity; and his thought went through the clouds and cobwebs of the modern mind like cleansing lightning and a-rushing wind. The air of European philosophy is clearer and fresher now because Nietzsche wrote.

On Henri Bergson:

It was a wholesome thing that this eloquent challenge should check the excesses of intellectualism; but it was as unwise to offer intuition in the place of thought as it would be to correct the fancies of youth, with the fairy-tales of childhood. Let us correct our errors forward, not backward. To say that the world suffers from too much intellect would require the courage of a madman. The romantic protest against thinking, from Rousseau and Chateaubriand to Bergson and Nietzsche and James, has done,its work; we will agree to dethrone the Goddess of Reason if we are not asked to re-light the candles before the ikon of Intuition. Man exists by instinct, but he progresses by intelligence.

On Bertrand Russell:

There have been two Bertrand Russells: one who died during the war; and another who rose out of that one’s shroud, an almost mystic communist born out of the ashes of a mathematical logician. Perhaps there was a tender mystic strain in him always; represented at first by a mountain of algebraic formulae; and then finding a distorted expression in a socialism that has the earmarks rather of a religion than of a philosophy. The most characteristic title among his books is Mysticism and Logic: a merciless attack on the illogicality of mysticism, followed by such a glorification of scientific method as makes one think of the mysticism of logic. Russell inherits the English positivist tradition, and is resolved to be tough-minded, because he knows that he cannot…

It is remarkable that after writing several volumes of this learned moonshine, Bertrand Russell should suddenly come down upon the surface of this planet, and begin to reason very passionately about war, and government, and socialism, and revolution,– and never once make use of the impeccable formulae piled like Pelion upon Ossa in his Principia Mathematica. Nor has anyone else, observably, made use of them…

Freedom is the supreme good; for without it personality is impossible. Freedom of thought and speech would go like a cleansing draught through the neuroses and superstitions of the “modern” mind. For we are not so educated as we think; we are but beginning the great experiment of universal schooling; and it has not had time to affect profoundly our ways of thinking and our public life. We are building the equipment, but we are still primitive in methods and technique; we think of education as the transmission of a certain body of settled knowledge, when it should be rather the development of a scientific habit of mind. The distinctive feature of the unintelligent man is the hastiness and absoluteness of his opinions; the scientist is slow to believe, and never speaks without modification…

There is nothing that man might not do if our splendid organization of schools and universities were properly developed and properly manned, and directed intelligently to the reconstruction of human character. This, and not violent revolution, or paper legislation, is the way out of economic greed and international brutality. Man has come to control all other forms of life because he has taken more time in which to grow up; when he takes still more time, and spends that time more wisely, he may learn even to control arid. remake himself. Our schools are the open sesame to Utopia…

All in all, a very lovable man: capable of the profoundest metaphysics and the subtlest mathematics, and yet speaking always simply, with the clarity which comes only to those who are sincere; a man addicted to fields of thought that usually dry up the springs of feeling, and yet warmed and illumined with pity, full of an almost mystic tenderness for mankind. Not a courtier, but surely a scholar and a gentleman, and a better Christian than some who mouth the word. Happily, he is still young and vigorous, the flame of life burns brightly in him yet; who knows but this next decade will see him grow out of disillusionment into wisdom, and write his name among the highest in “the serene brotherhood of philosophs”?

On George Santayana:

“Wisdom comes by disillusionment,” says Santayana; but again that is only the beginning of wisdom, as doubt is the beginning of philosophy; it is not also the end and fulfillment. The end is happiness and philosophy is only a means; if we take it as an end we become like the Hindu mystic whose life-purpose is to concentrate upon his navel.

On William James:

Certainly, as everyone has pointed out, the manner, if not the substance, of James’s thinking was specifically and uniquely American. The American lust for movement and acquisition fills the sails of his style and thought, and gives them a buoyant and almost aerial motility. Huneker calls it “a philosophy for philistines,” and indeed there is something that smacks of salesmanship in it: James talks of God as of an article to be sold to a materialistically-minded consumer by every device of optimistic advertising; and he counsels us to believe as if he were recommending long-term investments, with high dividends, in which there was nothing to lose, and all the (other) world to win. It was young America’s defense-reaction against European metaphysics and European Science…

When some pragmatists speak of a belief having been true once because they were useful (though now disproved), they utter nonsense learnedly; it was a useful error, not a truth. Pragmatism is correct only if it is a platitude.

On John Dewey:

In an industrial society the school should be a miniature workshop and a miniature community; it should teach through practice, and through trial and error, the arts and discipline necessary for economic and social order. And finally, education must be re-conceived, not as merely a preparation for maturity (whence our absurd idea that it should stop after adolescence), but as a continuous growth of the mind and a continuous illumination of life. In a sense, the schools can give us only the instrumentalities of mental growth; the rest depends upon our absorption and interpretation of experience. Real education comes after we leave school; and there is no reason why it should stop before our death…

What Dewey sees and reverences as the finest of all things, as growth; so much so, that he makes this relative but specific notion, and no absolute “good,” his ethical criterion…

Our trust must after all be in thought, and not in instinct;–how could instinct adjust us to the increasingly artificial environment which industry has built around us, and the maze of intricate problems in which we are enmeshed?…

But political reconstruction will come only when we apply to our social problems the experimental methods and attitudes which have succeeded so well in the natural sciences. We are still in the metaphysical stage of political philosophy; we fling abstractions at one another’s heads, and when the battle is over nothing is won. We cannot cure our social ills with wholesale ideas, magnificent generalizations like individualism or order, democracy or monarchy or aristocracy, or what not. We must meet each problem with a specific hypothesis, and no universal theory; theories are tentacles, and fruitful progressive living must rely on trial and error.

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